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/// Infrastructure
In James Graham Ballard’s novella Concrete Island, architect Robert 
Maitland crashes his Jaguar over a motorway embankment onto a 
traffic island, a thin triangle of waste ground two hundred meters 
long.1 Here, in a parody of Robinson Crusoe, he finds himself ma-
rooned: 
His jacket and trousers were stained with sweat, mud and en-
gine grease. Few drivers, even if they did notice him, would be 
eager to give him a lift. Besides, it would be almost impossible 
to slow down here and stop. The pressure of the following traf-
fic, free at last from the long tail-backs that always blocked 
the Westway interchange during the rush hour, forced them on 
relentlessly.2 
The fast-flowing arms of the motorway continue to operate perfectly, 
ensuring the rapid movement of bodies and objects; but their opera-
tion is inaccessible to Maitland. Immobilized by the infrastructure of 
mobility, he has not simply exited urban life, he has slipped off the 
grid while remaining firmly within its network of effects. 
It is useful to distinguish between the idea of space as a container, 
and the idea of space as connection. In a threshold space, things, 
effects, and events are contained or exteriorized; in a transforma-
tional space,  they are transmitted. Harry Beck’s seminal map of 
the London Underground (1931) locates stations according to their 
topological relationship and their connections to one other, not their 
geographical position. For someone traversing the network, it is 
more important to know which connections are available at any given 
point and where transfers need to be made, than to know distances 
1 James Graham Ballard, Concrete Island. London: Jonathan Cape, 
1974.
2 James Graham Ballard, Concrete Island. London: Jonathan Cape, 
1974.
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travelled or which stretches of track are underground and which are 
in the open air. Containment is secondary to connection. To pass 
outside in threshold space is to cross a line demarcating an interior, 
whether by choice, accident, or involuntary ejection. In transforma-
tional space, however, there is no strict exterior, only degrees of con-
nection. Charing Cross, on Beck’s map, differs from Edgeware not 
because it is a more capacious station, with better amenities and 
more platforms, but because it has greater connectivity. 
Similarly, a motorway folds the city, creating points of accelerated 
connection and compressing distance. It cuts through the city like a 
street, but unlike a street, access can only be gained at certain stra-
tegic points where there are on-ramps. These short circuits modify 
the connectivity of the street-grid, and vary the ability of certain types 
of effects to propagate through the city. An accident at one point 
of the network can create congestion at another point. A business 
might choose to locate itself close to an on-ramp in order to facilitate 
rapid transmission of its goods. From the perspective of an urban 
inhabitant, the motorway is normally considered as a space of pure 
connection, barring an accident such as  Maitland’s. In the spatial 
operation of the motorway, the question of interiority is secondary, 
even problematic, compared to questions of access and the types 
of effect that thereby propagate.
So long as I am carrying a working phone, I have access to a cell-
phone network, and can have remote effects through it. If my phone 
stops working, however, being ‘within’ the area of coverage is of no 
use to me. Without access, I am off the grid. From the point of view of 
a threshold spatiality, I could be said to be in the network, but without 
a connection or the capacity to have effects on other elements of the 
network, this would be a hollow claim: the dialectic of exteriority / 
interiority can have little to say about my situation.
In the twentieth century, infrastructures became key determinants of 
urban form, and consequently of spatial experience and politics. In 
directing design attention to this cultural condition, an understand-
ing of the nondialectical and transformational space of networks is 
necessary.
/// Failure
Pierre Bélanger suggests that infrastructure “remains largely invis-
ible until the precise moment at which it breaks down or fails.”3 This 
paper began with a moment of infrastructural failure: Maitland’s Jag-
uar crashing through a barrier, and Maitland falling off the grid. He 
3 Pierre Bélanger, Landscape Infrastructure: Emerging Practices, Para-
digms & Technologies Reshaping the Contemporary Urban Landscape. 
[DVD]. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2008.
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suddenly experiences the motorway as an explicit object whereas 
previously it had functioned transparently.
In Heidegger, we find an attribution of existential significance to the 
interchange between the visible and invisible aspects of an entity 
foregrounded by failure. He posits the way a tool withdraws into in-
visibility through use, but erupts into consciousness once it fails.4 A 
hammer in use is not a subject of explicit awareness, but is simply 
relied upon for some end: perhaps building a boat or re-attaching 
the legs of a stool. As the hammer disappears into its operation, it 
becomes more fully itself: 
[T]he less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we 
seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our rela-
tionship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered 
as that which it is—as equipment.5
The being of the tool is disclosed most fully not through analysis or 
study, but through its performance. In this situation, Heidegger says 
the hammer is “ready-at-hand.” When the hammer breaks, however, 
and the carpenter is left staring blankly at the now-ineffective imple-
ment, the hammer erupts suddenly into awareness in the mode of 
“presence-to-hand.” Readiness-at-hand and presence-to-hand are 
not separate kinds of objects, but as Boedeker puts it, “two modes 
of the how-being of intraworldly entities.”6 In use, the tool refers on 
to the task at hand, and when its use is interrupted, this reference is 
disturbed.
Graham Harman argues controversially that Heidegger’s insight is 
not limited to human encounters with objects — even if Heidegger 
himself believed this to be the case.7 He believes that withdrawal 
through reference and presence-to-hand through encounter is part 
of the structure of all entities. Paper, for example, encounters the 
knife as knife in some sense at least, even given the obvious fact 
that the paper does not have consciousness of the knife, because 
it clearly does not encounter it as a pebble or drop saw. Each par-
ticular encounter is a moment of presence-to-hand, behind which 
both the thing encountered and the encounterer withdraw into the 
execution of their own being as part of the total in its “equipmental 
totality”or “referential contexture.”8 
4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1962.
5 Ibid.
6 Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, A companion to Heidegger. Mal-
den, MA: Blackwell, 2005.
7 Graham Harman, Tool-being. Chicago: Open Court, 2006.
8 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1962, and Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, A 
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As revealed in Maitland’s encounter, the motorway as a seamless 
cultural system is broken and there is exposure of “a vast environ-
mental backdrop supporting the thin and volatile layer of our explicit 
activities.”9 But the motorway exceeds this encounter: other road 
users successfully navigate its lanes, and homeless people sleep 
under its bridges. If we follow Harman’s expansion of the scope of 
Heidegger’s terms to encompass non-human encounters, we could 
also count the rain running off it, birds perching on its lighting masts, 
and carbon monoxide being released into the atmosphere. Mait-
land’s experience is one moment of presence-to-hand, but in each 
of these encounters there is a form of presence-to-hand, and behind 
them all is a withdrawal into the performative being of readiness-at-
hand. Withdrawal could be seen as the hyperobjectivity of all ob-
jects: the movement by which they exceed any single encounter and 
remain always open to others. Presence-to-hand is bounded by the 
horizon of a particular encounter, but withdrawing beyond this hori-
zon is an infinitely connected equipmental totality.
/// Off the grid
When Maitland falls off the grid, he does not fall outside. Ballard calls 
into question the applicability of a threshold spatiality to the network 
by placing Maitland in an ambiguous position: simultaneously out-
side and pocketed. The bursting of a tire triggers a reconfiguration 
of a network of elements in which Maitland finds himself even more 
deeply enmeshed. As the narrative unfolds it becomes evident that 
Maitland’s alienation is not strictly an incarceration or exile, but a 
personal failure to connect: there is a phone, but he cannot get to it; 
a car stops for him, but he waves it on aggressively. 
Following this argument, ‘outside’ pertains to threshold space, but 
‘off the grid’ pertains to transformational space. When we fall off the 
grid, we do not escape it by exiting across any absolute horizon or 
threshold. We remain engaged in the grid’s network of effects, even 
if those effects are indirect, remote, or weak. Off the grid is a position 
that exposes or engages these secondary effects that are masked 
by the horizons of specific encounters. As Maitland speeds along 
the motorway, his encounter is specific and bounded. Withdrawn 
over the horizons of this encounter, however, are a vast network of 
referrals — things operating or performing relations — that are ex-
posed at the moment of his stranding. In siting ourselves off the grid, 
we encounter hitherto withdrawn aspects of the grid, but not from 
the perspective of a disengaged observer. Off the grid describes 
this state of being alongside, encountering obliquely something that 
had been operating previously in a transparent way. This perspective 
companion to Heidegger. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005.
9 Graham Harman, Tool-being. Chicago: Open Court, 2006.
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reveals potently the ontological shifts implicit in a transformational 
concept of space. From off the grid, I encounter my own connec-
tions in ways I had previously been unaware. My shift in perspective 
unveils the world as a referential contexture. 
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